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• The UK Government should be aware of the impediments to democracy in 
Turkey, particularly with regards to the limitations on freedom of expression. 
• Turkey will make a strong partner to the UK government in the pursuit of 
democracy in the newly emerging regimes after the Arab Spring. Nevertheless, to 
what extent Turkey can represent a ‘model’ to those regimes is uncertain. 
• Turkey-EU relations have faced a stalemate due to lack of credible commitment to 
Turkish accession by some EU Member States as well as the Turkish government. 
However, still, the UK Government is correct in pursuing the Turkish EU 
membership as a long-term objective. 
• The Cypriot conflict cannot realistically be resolved in the near future due to the 
wide gap between the Turkish and EU positions. Nevertheless, incremental steps 
may be taken for the establishment of free trade between the island as a whole and 
the Turkish-EU customs union area. 
 
• In the meantime, the UK government should pursue strategies to prove credible 
EU commitment to Turkish membership that would re-elevate the public support 
for EU membership in Turkey, such as an easing of visa restrictions.       
 
A. Quality of democracy, the rule of law and human rights in Turkey 
 
1. Between the recognition of Turkey’s EU candidateship in 1999 by the Helsinki 
European Council and the second term of the AKP (Justice and Development Party) 
in government (2007-2011) Turkey adopted painstaking reforms to improve 
democracy and the rule of law. These reforms served Turkey most significantly by 
shifting the political power from military to civil institutions. Nevertheless, during the 
second AKP government in parallel to the stalemate in Turkey-EU relations the 
reform process came to a halt and a trend (re-)emerged for the centralisation of power 
in the hands of the government. We are of the opinion that the UK government should 
be aware of the current impediments to democracy in Turkey. In support of this 
argument we provide evidence below from two specific incidents (the 2010 
constitutional reform process and the political crisis surrounding politicians held in 
jail) as well as the general impediments to freedom of expression.  
2. The AKP government proposed an extensive constitutional reform initiative in 
2010 that pursued convergence with the EU standards in certain matters, such as the 
judicial control of administrative and criminal decisions of the military.1 However, the 
reform package also brought a significant increase of political power in the 
appointment of high court justices. Additionally, the reform process was not in line 
with the standards of an established participatory democracy where constitutional 
reforms are expected to reflect a societal consensus reached through deliberations 
between different political groups and civil society organisations. 
3. The 2010 reform package was drafted by the AKP government almost 
singlehandedly and despite the strong opposition of civil society organisations, 
including the Union of Judges and Prosecutors, and the Union of Bars. The 

1 See the comparative table regarding the Proposed Legislation for the Amendment of Certain 




parliamentary vote on the reforms failed to reach the required two-third majority and 
the reform package was henceforth sent to a public referendum. The opposition 
parties demanded that the different amendments were split into different questions on 
the referendum ballot paper to avoid a take-it or leave-it choice. The government 
rejected this request, and the entire amendment package was passed with the support 
of 57.9% of the vote. 
4. During the 2011 election, the government has campaigned on its intend to overhaul 
the constitution. However, the AKP manifesto did not make any concrete suggestion 
as to what constitutional clauses should be amended and how. Prime Minister 
Erdoan pleaded the electorate to provide his party with a 2/3 majority of seats in the 
Parliament which would allow for constitutional reform without the cooperation of 
opposition. This forthcoming reform process needs to followed closely particularly in 
the light of the experiences with the 2010 constitutional reforms. 
5. After the June 2011 elections, the Parliament found itself in a political crisis 
surrounding politicians held in detention: two MPs of the CHP (Republican People’s 
Party) are imprisoned under the Ergenekon investigation into an alleged coup attempt; 
six MPs of the Kurdish BDP (Peace and Democracy Party) were arrested under the 
KCK operations against the urban wing of PKK (the Kurdish Workers’ Party); finally, 
one MP from the MHP (Nationalist Action Party) is held under the Balyoz 
investigation, yet another investigation into an alleged coup. Of these nine MPs, only 
one MP of the BDP, Hatip Dicle, is convicted in a court of law for being a member of 
the PKK based on his public statements. 
6. After the elections, the Turkish Board of Elections stripped Dicle of his 
parliamentary mandate and reallocated his seat to AKP, since the BDP fielded 
independent candidates – rather than a party list – to circumvent the 10% national 
election threshold. Additionally, Turkish lower courts have so far refused to release 
the four of the remaining eight jailed MPs, while final decisions regarding the 
remaining detainees are pending. The BDP MPs called the AKP to initiate necessary 
legal reforms for the release of their imprisoned members; and with this aim they 
have boycotted the Parliament. Negotiations between the AKP and the BDP failed, 
after the AKP refused to amend Article 7 of the Turkish Anti-Terror Act to allow the 
detained BDP members to take their seats in the Parliament. This was followed by 
 
escalation of violence and terror in Southeast Turkey and a declaration by the Kurdish 
Democratic Society Congress (that brings together a wider spectrum of the Kurdish 
political elite) of what they called ‘democratic autonomy’.2 
7. This political crisis constitutes a significant cursor for the current state of 
democracy in Turkey from different perspectives: first, it shows that despite the 
abovementioned constitutional reforms, some clusters of society still face significant 
barriers on the way to democratic representation. Second, the upfront refusal of the 
AKP to implement the necessary reforms for the release of arrested politicians leads 
to a serious questioning of this party’s commitment to democracy when it benefits 
other political groups. N.b. that AKP leader Recep Tayyip Erdoan was subject to a 
similar legal caveat during the 2002 elections; and he became eligible to assume 
office as MP and prime minister only after the CHP had cooperated with the AKP to 
amend the constitution accordingly. 
8. The immediate reliance by the Kurdish forces to methods of violence leads to a 
serious questioning of the Kurdish opposition’s commitment to democratic process in 
the search for equal representation and minority protection. If this crisis remains 
unresolved and if the reforms are adopted without the contribution of Kurdish 
representatives, the new constitution will have limited value at best for the 
improvement of democracy and minority protection in Turkey. Overall, the crisis does 
not bode well for the future of Turkish democracy.  
9. Finally, the Turkish civil society and media have been under serious pressure.3 
Most significantly, Turkey currently holds the largest number of imprisoned 
journalists in the world.4 For instance, the aforementioned Ergenekon investigation 
has notoriously become a pretext to punish government-critical journalists. The most 
prominent names in this respect include Mustafa Balbay, Soner Yalçın, Ahmet ık 
and Nedim ener. 

2 In the light of the previous declarations of the BDP and the Congress, democratic autonomy refers to 
regional autonomous governance that is somewhat similar to a state within a federal regime. 
3  Report by Thomas Hammarberg, Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe 
following his visit to Turkey, from 27 to 29 April 2011 – Freedom of expression and media freedom in 
Turkey, Strasbourg, 12 July 2011, CommDH(2011)25.  
4 ‘Turkey 'world leader' in imprisoned journalists, IPI report says’, Hürriyet Daily News, 8 April 2011. 
 
10. The general discrepancies in the Turkish justice system, most notably unusually 
long arrest periods, exacerbate the impediments to freedom of expression. At the time 
of the writing of this report, Ahmet ık and Nedim ener have been arrested for more 
than 160 days without a formal indictment against them. 
11. Self-censorship is also an issue in Turkey. Over the last few years, numerous 
government-critical journalists have lost their jobs. Banu Güven, a top TV anchor 
who shared this destiny, recently wrote a public letter to the Prime Minister and 
pleaded for the removal of pressures on media.5 
B. Turkey as a model for other Muslim countries in the context of the Arab 
Spring 
12. Turkey has arguably the most solid democratic regime in its region, not least 
because of its regular, open and transparent parliamentary elections. The threats of 
military coups have decreased significantly – mainly due to the AKP’s de-
militarisation of state institutions.  
13. Turkey has strong political and economic ties with the countries of the ‘Arab 
Spring’, particularly Libya. During the time of writing of this report the Turkish 
government is preparing the Libya summit that is taking place in early September in 
Istanbul. The Turkish government has recognised the National Interim Council as the 
legitimate representation of the Libyan people in early July and the Turkish 
government has since kept close relations with the Council’s president, Mustafa 
Abdel Dschalil. 
14. Additionally, after the appointment of Ahmet Davutolu as Foreign Affairs 
Minister, the government has adopted a policy of ‘zero problems’ with neighbours. 
Therefore, the AKP government initially adopted a cautious tone with regard to the 
civil awakenings in the Middle East and North Africa. Nevertheless, eventually the 
government became openly critical and vocal about the state imposed violence on 
protestors in these countries. 

5 ‘Bir Mektup’ [‘A Letter’], http://banuguven.com/2011/07/14/bir-mektup/. See also Ayla Albayrak, 
‘Zipped-Lips in Turkey’s Media’, Wall Street Journal, 18 July 2011. 
 
 
15. Most recently, Mr. Davutolu communicated a clear message of discontent to the 
Syrian Government with regard to human rights violations taking place in Hama 
during his visit to this country. This message was communicated in close 
collaboration with the US Department of State. In contrast to the decreasing 
popularity of the UK (and other Western countries) among the peoples of Muslim 
countries, particularly after the invasion of Iraq, Turkey has become immensely 
popular in these countries with its strong economy, its vibrant popular culture and its 
vocal stance in international politics. 
16. Prime Minister Erdoan, in particular, has come to be seen as a potential leader 
for the Muslim world in general after his open and strong criticism of the Israeli 
government in the 2009 World Economic Forum and after the 2010 flotilla incident. 
All of these stand as evidence that the Turkish government will make a strong partner 
to the UK in the pursuit of democracy in the countries of Arab Spring. Due to cultural 
similarities as well as the popularity of Turkey in those countries, the Turkish 
government may be able to communicate closely and deeply with the local forces 
involved in the design of new regimes.  
17. Whether Turkey represents a ‘model’ for the region is an altogether different 
question. As many as seventeen countries are involved in the Arab Spring - Egypt, 
Libya, Syria and Tunisia being subject to the most substantial systemic changes.6  
Searching for a single model of democracy in a post-dictatorial scenario for even 
these four countries is an insurmountable task. Such a plan would fall short due to 
cultural, historical and institutional differences between the different Arab nations; 
and a ‘regime transplant’ from Turkey to these countries is, thus, destined to fail. 
Even if Turkey is to constitute a model for those countries, it has to be established 
beyond the separation-of-state-and-religion rhetoric in what way the Turkish regime 
represents an ideal from the institutional perspective; in our eyes this is not at all 
certain. 
18. The answer to this question will also depend on the level of ambition of the UK 
government in the pursuit of democracy in the newly emerging regimes. In 
collaboration with the local forces, the UK government and its partners should press 

6 See the Guarding guide on Arab Spring at 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/interactive/2011/mar/22/middle-east-protest-interactive-timeline>. 
 
for, inter alia, free and transparent elections, judicial independence, gender equality, 
freedom of expression and effective minority protection. As the evidence presented 
above suggests, in some of these areas Turkey itself should be regarded as a work in 
progress rather than a transferable model for the Arab Spring nations.  
C. Government support for Turkey’s EU membership  
 
19. Turkey has long tried to become a member of the European Union and we are 
convinced that the UK government should continue to advocate in favour of Turkish 
membership. To shed light on the background: Turkey has first voiced its intention to 
join the then European Economic Community (EEC) in 1959. Although the Ankara 
Agreement was signed in 1963 to pave the way for a customs union, this goal was 
achieved eventually in 1995. When it was finally declared in 1997 that Turkey was 
eligible to join the EU, ten years had passed since the country had formally applied 
for membership. Cultural discrimination aside, it is difficult to see why the Union 
would need ten years to declare a country eligible for membership – which is a far cry 
from membership itself.  
 
20. Turkey has climbed to 17th place in the list of largest economies of the world, 
while most of the EU member states are struggling under the economic crisis. Turkey 
offers dynamism to Europe with its young, vibrant and growing population. 
 
21. Turkey had adopted the most courageous reforms in its history when the EU 
membership appeared as a realistic goal; and the trend for centralisation of power 
emerged only when Turkey-EU relations came to a halt. Therefore, if the accession 
process is reinvigorated successfully the EU could again serve as a significant 
reference point for the improvement of democracy and the rule of law in Turkey. 
 
22. The European Union was not created as a judeo-christian institution but rather a 
union of like-minded countries that seek common economic (and political) goals. 
There is thus no reason why Turkey should not join its neighbouring union for 
cultural reasons. Turkey’s Muslim population will clearly be enrichment to the Union 
that reflects the political reality of today’s world. A reinvigoration of the accession 
process and building of closer ties with the Turkish people would also help the EU 
 
countries in the fight against Islamophobia. Therefore, the UK government would do 
well in standing up against some of the more prejudiced European governments that 
are against Turkish membership due to religious and/or ethnic reasons. 
 
D. Government actions to reinvigorate accession negotiations 
 
23. Turkey’s EU accession suffers from two key impediments: the current division of 
Cyprus and the drop in public/political support for EU membership in Turkey. 
 
24. Concerning Cyprus a wide gap between the positions of the EU and Turkey 
continues to exist: the Turkish government perceives the admission of Cyprus as an 
EU Member State without the resolution of Cypriot conflict a discrimination between 
EU candidates. This is because under the Copenhagen criteria, the EU officially does 
not admit a country with political conflicts with its neighbours. In 2004 Turkey signed 
the Additional Protocol with regard to the application of Turkey-EU customs union 
rules to the new EU Member States. Nevertheless, Turkey refuses to apply those rules 
to Cyprus unless economic isolation of the Turkish society in Northern Cyprus is 
lifted. The EU, on the other hand, refuses to negotiate key accession chapters with 
regard to the internal market with Turkey unless the customs union rules are applied 
to Cyprus. 
 
25. Due to this wide gap and the sensitive nature of the Cyprus issue in national 
politics in Turkey and within some EU Member States the conflict cannot realistically 
be resolved all at once in the near future. Nevertheless, both sides may be convinced 
to take incremental steps over time for the establishment of free trade between the 
island as a whole and the Turkish-EU customs union area. The UK government, with 
its close ties to Cyprus as well as Turkey certainly occupies an ideal position to 
pursue a proactive role with this aim. The swift establishment of a functioning 
customs union must mark the starting point to solve the Cyprus issue in the long term. 
 
27. The decreasing public support for EU membership in Turkey can be seen partially 
as a result of its remarkable economic performance during the least years. However, 
part of the reason is also lack of credible commitments on behalf of the Union and 
some of its member states to Turkish membership. So far, the EU accession process 
 
has resulted in only marginal, if any, implications on the daily life of Turkish citizens. 
For instance, Turkish citizens face extremely strict visa policies when travelling to the 
EU, in contrast to the citizens of Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, FYR Macedonia, 
Montenegro and Serbia who are all given visa-free travel rights throughout the 
Schengen area. We argue that a liberalisation of the visa restrictions will go a long 
way in rekindling the Turkish popular support for EU membership. The UK 
government should work towards a less rigid visa policy for Turkish citizens. This 
would increase popular support for EU membership in Turkey; and would provide the 
Turkish government with incentives to commit to the accession process and to 
continue implementing the necessary legal and political reforms.  
 
E. Does Turkey still want to join the EU?  
 
24. The Turkish government appears to have put its EU-ambitions onto the 
backburner with a political focus shifted to the goal of regional leadership instead – 
particularly due to the Arab Spring. Yet, it is unlikely that Turkey can assert its 
regional leadership role without its close relations to the EU; and this includes a 
continuation (and eventual conclusion) of the accession negotiations. Turkish 
government must surely be aware that Turkey’s raising profile in its region at least 
partially stems from the different status of Turkey as a EU candidate and a NATO 
member. Therefore, we believe that an effort by the EU institutions and the Member 
States to overcome the current stalemate will find a positive reaction on the side of 
Turkey.   
 
 
